In this Paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce's method of prescision as a transcendental method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce's pragmatism can be interpreted in a transcendental light only if we use a non-justificatory understanding of transcendental philosophy. I show how Peirce's prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce's and Kant's methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions.
Introduction 1
Even if Peirce has often been read against the background of his Kantian legacy, it was Karl Otto Apel who first developed a systematic transcendental interpretation, which considered Peirce's philosophy as both a development and an enhancement of the Kantian project 2 . Since Apel's book was published there has been some debate about the legitimacy of his reading of Peirce. Nowadays, the anti-transcendental interpretation of Peirce is certainly predominant 3 , even though there have been continuing attempts to develop a renewed transcendental consideration of Peirce's thought 4 .
In this study, I aim to contribute to this discussion. I do not wish to argue for Apel's interpretation, but rather to provide a renewed transcendental consideration of Peirce, offering an account of transcendental philosophy which is explanatory rather than justificatory. First, I will briefly introduce two very different pictures of the transcendental method through two distinct interpretations of Kant. I will call these two interpretations the 'justificatory account' and the 'alternative account' of Kant. I will suggest that it is this latter, 'alternative', account which is closer to Kant's real aim in his critical project. Peirce's method does not need to be justificatory to be interpreted in this way. Finally, I
will examine the way in which Peirce's project goes beyond many of the difficulties that we find in Kant's transcendental philosophy.
Two Ways of Interpreting Kant
'Transcendental' is often employed in an unclear manner in the literature, and some of the senses in which the word is understood certainly cannot be attributed to
Peirce. I will try to shed light on the way in which I use the word by introducing two possible ways of interpreting Kant 5 .
I will call the first kind of interpretation the justificatory account of Kant. According to this interpretation, Kant was a philosopher who attempted to secure our knowledge against the attacks of any potential skeptics. Thus, Kant's project would have tried to answer the problems which Descartes introduced to philosophy, and which culminated in Hume's skepticism. Accordingly, Kant's aim would have been to vindicate the objectivity of our knowledge. His 'Copernican revolution' would have consisted in his claim that objectivity is warranted as far as outer objects are literally products of our minds. Three features characterize this reading. It holds that Kant: a) develops a justificatory philosophy which tries to answer the skeptic, b) endorses a mentalistic standpoint in which the connection of mental ideas to the outer world needs to be vindicated, c) provides a strongly deductive strategy based on indubitable first premises.
Peter Strawson's interpretation of Kant is a good example of such a reading 6 .
Both the analytic argument that Strawson tries to disentangle from the rest of the
Critique and the faulty metaphysics that he attributed to Kant share these characteristics.
It is, however, Kant himself who allows himself to be interpret like this. For example, when Kant stresses that Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumber 7 , he suggests that one of his main purposes was to answer the Scottish philosopher's skepticism on causation. Obviously, an account of transcendental philosophy constructed like this cannot be attributed to Peirce. It would run against Peirce's anti-foundationalism and his fallibilism 8 . Moreover, this is the very account of the transcendental method against which Peirce's own criticisms are directed 9 .
However, Kant also provides the means for interpreting his transcendental philosophy in quite a different manner. My purpose here is not to ascertain definitatively which interpretation is better, but to find a way to account for transcendental philosophy which would be compatible with Peirce's philosophy. It is for this reason that my attention now turns to this alternative way of reading Kant.
Examples of this interpretation are offered by Henry E. Allison, Graham Bird and Arthur Collins 10 . I will call this second interpretation the alternative account of Kant.
According to this alternative account, Kant's first aim was not that of securing human knowledge against the doubts that Descartes and the empiricists set against it
11
. On the contrary, Kant understood questioning the validity of our mathematical and empirical knowledge to be futile, since in these fields inquirers were not facing any problem at all.
It was metaphysics that needed a philosophical justification, insofar as it had no instrument to settle its everlasting debates (KrV, B vii-xv) . In this respect, Kant's philosophy has an important pragmatic character. Kant, just like Charles Peirce, thought that doubting our knowledge, and thus making a request for justification, was meaningless, unless there was a reason to do so (KrV, . The only kind of knowledge that Kant questioned was speculative knowledge not grounded in any way on experience.
Moreover, Kant's claim that inner and outer representations have equal validity seems to leave behind exactly that mentalistic framework which required an antiskeptical justification (KrV, A 38 B 55, A 371) . It is true that Kant stressed that both inner and outer objects were representations, but we have to interpret that claim as emphasizing that all objects we can represent possess some features that depend on their being in relation to us. This is not the same as saying that all objects are inside our minds.
Following this alternative interpretation, Kant did not even need to provide a strongly deductive argument based on indubitable first premises. On the contrary, Kant actually began his inquiry taking the fact of human knowledge and experience for granted, as they were described both in ordinary practices and the sciences. His aim was that of abstracting from such knowledge and experience the elements without which the former two would be unaccountable. These are the elements that the object possesses only insofar as it is in relation with us. They are features of knowledge and experience that depend on their being representative endeavors. For this reason, transcendental philosophy inquires into our knowledge and experience, and abstracts those elements without which knowledge and experience would be unintelligible as representative activities.
But why would a transcendental project understood in this explanatory way be needed? In Kant's case, his project was a critical undertaking, and specifically a critical undertaking directed against the drawbacks of pure philosophy. Accordingly, Kant's first Critique is more concerned with ascertaining the validity of the knowledge claimed by dogmatic philosophers than with that claimed by the sciences or common-sense.
These latter did not need to be validated in so far as they did not produce any apparently insoluble controversy. However, before ascertaining the limits of pure philosophy, a task he reserved for the Dialectic, Kant had first to scrutinize human knowledge in order to disentangle the a priori structure which functions as a condition of empirical knowledge. It is exactly this step of his transcendental project that can be considered explanatory. In the Analytic, he took into consideration empirical and mathematical knowledge, and he disentangled the a priori structure that only a transcendental inquiry could bring to the fore. In fact, Kant considered the main question of his first Critique to be: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (KrV, B 19) . That is to say, he never doubted the validity of our mathematical and empirical knowledge. He wanted merely to isolate the a priori source of some elements in that knowledge. If he had wanted to justify knowledge as such, he would have asked if synthetic a priori judgments were possible, not how they were possible. Only after this explanatory endeavor was completed could Kant criticize the illegitimate use of the categories in metaphysics.
Of course, the kind of explanation that Kant wanted to provide in his first
Critique is different from the explanations of other sciences such as physics, chemistry, and so forth. What he needs to explain is not a general fact about the world, but our ability to provide explanations in science and everyday life. He thus provides a kind of second-order investigation on the elements that are common in our knowledge.
Moreover, Kant did want to inquire into the validity of metaphysical knowledge, and his philosophy resulting from this is indirectly validatory of our mathematical and empirical knowledge. In this manner, prescision is able to show hierarchical relationships among concepts. It shows which concept is necessary to think the other, insofar as the former is involved in the latter. For that reason, color can be prescinded from red, but red cannot be prescinded from color. In fact, one cannot think red without thinking it as a kind of color. On the contrary, one can think the concept of color in general without reference to any particular one. It has to be kept in mind that the kind of hierarchical relationships that prescision aims to discern are not psychological. Saying that I can prescind color from red is not the same as saying that I cannot have in my mind the idea of red without having also the idea of color. It shows a logical involvement or independence.
Accordingly, the concept that is prescindable from the other shows a logical independence which gives it a higher place in the hierarchical order 13 .
However, if prescision is adapted for abstracting some concepts from others, thus showing a hierarchical order among them, how could it be useful in a transcendental inquiry? Prescision becomes philosophically relevant when it is applied not simply to organizing a set of ordinary concepts, but rather to disentangling the fundamental concepts which account for our experience and thought. In fact, it is for this purpose that Peirce clarified the method of prescision. He used it to abstract his three categories and to shed light on the relationships among them. To do this, he applied prescision to experience and thought in general, attempting to isolate those elements without which such experience and thought would have been unaccountable.
Thus, in reference to experience as a whole, prescision can show 'that the elements conjoined cannot be supposed without the conception, whereas the conception can generally be supposed without these elements' (W 2:51). That is, in order to discern those elements that are fundamental for explaining our experience, I have to take into consideration experience in general and isolate those elements which can be prescinded from the rest. Thus, if these elements were actually fundamental they could be prescinded from experience, whereas experience could never be prescinded from them 14 .
So, Peirce used prescision to isolate his categories from the rest of experience and thought because it was able to detect a conceptual relationship that was not reciprocal. When applied to experience and thought in general this kind of logical analysis can isolate those elements that were necessary to account for such experience and thought. If we come back to Kant, and in particular to his argument for the a priori nature of time, we discover a similar line of reasoning.
In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time (KrV, A 31 B 46) 15 .
Kant is suggesting that if we take into consideration our experience in general, we can consider time regardless of particular phenomena, while experience in general cannot be thought of without time
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. A similar position is reserved for the unity of apperception. Without the unity of apperception, it would not be possible to think of any unity in experience 17 . Thus, experience in general cannot prescind from that original unity, while we can consider the unity of apperception prescinding from particular Kant's method of abstraction and Peirce's prescision thus share strong similarities. Of course it remains the case that Kant's and Peirce's purposes were really different when they tried to disentangle the fundamental categories of thought from the rest of our knowledge. Kant wanted to offer a general picture of human knowledge able to recognize its a priori elements. Moreover, he wanted to lay down the precise limits of a priori reasoning. On the contrary, Peirce, with his categories, wanted to clarify the elements that partake in the ongoing development of human thought and knowledge.
Peirce did this to provide tools which can enhance our ability as inquirers. For Peirce philosophy was not an armchair endeavor, but was the task of inquirers who had their own distinct contribution to make to the development of the sciences. As a consequence, Peirce's categories remain vague and are always evolving according to the historical situation in which they are determined. Within philosophy, it is phenomenology which indicates those elements that can be prescinded from any other. Accordingly, it presents the elements that are the most fundamental in order to account for the semiotic structure philosophy has to disentangle.
Thus, with the help of the logic of relatives, phenomenology analyzes that complex of semiotic processes which human thought consists of, and attempts to isolate the most fundamental and necessary elements within such thought, that is, Peirce's three categories.
It can further be said in advance, not, indeed, purely a priori but with the degree of apriority that is proper to logic, namely, as a necessary deduction from the fact that there are signs, that there must be an elementary triad (CP 1.292).
Evidently, for Peirce, a purely a priori deduction would have been one of the kind justificatory accounts ask for, that is, one developed from a certainly valid premise.
But, according to our picture of the transcendental method, Peirce's categories can indeed be considered a priori, since experience would be unaccountable without them, while they can be prescinded from particular experience. They can be considered a priori even if our first object of study needs to be semiotic processes as they are manifest in human practices 28 .
Peirce calls his categories firstness, secondness and thirdness. As these terms suggest, it is not really easy to grasp or exemplify what Peirce means by them. They are so general that they should account for every possible relation in thought, knowledge, objective reality, and so forth. To put it in simple terms, firstness refers to the mere presentation of a quality, or, alternatively, to the nature of a subject regardless of any relation with something else; secondess refers to direct and dynamic relations between two subjects, as for example in cause-effect relations; to finish, thirdness refers to a kind of relations in which the mediation of a third term is necessary, as for example in meaning and sign use. Peirce considers these three categories to be able to account for every kind of relation we might find in our thinking and knowledge, as well as in the objective world.
In order to bring out this a priori relational structure of experience and thought, phenomenology has to look into the semiotic whole of our representative practices, prescinding from the particular way in which meaning is conveyed and developed.
Thus, phenomenology takes into consideration semiotic processes and tries to consider them on a more abstract level, prescinding even from the special features that render a sign a sign. Phenomenology thus sheds light on the necessary relational basis on which even signification rests. The question on what is peculiar in the triadic relation of signification is not a matter for phenomenology, even if, focusing on human representations, its first objects of study are inevitably semiotic processes of thought.
Prescinding from the determinations that triadic, dyadic and monadic relations gain in sign processes, phenomenology also abstracts from the question of the validity of signs.
That is, it does not take into consideration whether the representations are dreams, illusions, or truthful knowledge
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. It simply looks into the complex of human semiotic processes and tries to abstract their fundamental relational structure, described by the categories. Thus, the categories, in order to be considered in a transcendental fashion, need not function as a mathematical starting point from which phenomenological and semiotic determination are directly derived. On the contrary, they just need to be prescinded from the semiotic whole that characterizes human practices, while showing that that semiotic whole cannot prescind from them 30 .
Peirce's phenomenological categories are thus the most fundamental elements of thought and shed light on its essential relational structure. They can thus be considered in a transcendental light, following our non-justificatory reconstruction of the transcendental method. As transcendental elements, they offer a basis for explaining the way in which that fundamental relational structure is determined in other branches of philosophy, namely, the normative sciences and metaphysics
31
.
However, I think there are some other elements in Peirce's philosophy that can also be considered transcendental, even if their relational structure can be accounted for only by means of the categories. These elements are the esthetic ideal and the regulative hopes. I think they need to be considered as being transcendental principles because they take a particular perspective on sign processes, a perspective that is typical of Peirce's methodeutic. This perspective is not limited to a general outline of the fundamental elements of experience and thought, but attempts to isolate those elements that are necessary actually to bring forward sign processes 32 . The esthetic ideal and the regulative hopes thus identify those principles that are necessary for engagement in actual courses of inference and investigation in order to reach the purpose in view. In this respect, the esthetic ideal, which is identified by Peirce's esthetics, accounts for the normativity of our feeling, acting and thinking. We judge our feeling to be beautiful, our actions to be right, our inferences to be sound, in reference to an ideal, and we seek to be consistent and coherent in these judgments. The esthetic ideal accounts also for the systematicity we seek in our inquiries. On the other hand, the regulative hopes, which are identified by Peirce's methodeutic, suggest the hypothesis that we must endorse when engaged in a process of thinking, that is, the hypothesis that the problem at hand does allow for a solution. Peirce thought that it was impossible for us to obtain a warrant that we would eventually get to know what we are inquiring into. However, we could not even engage in a process of inquiry if we did not endorse a regulative hope in the possibility of our success. By applying prescision even to these principles, they can be considered transcendental because they can be prescinded from the actual courses of investigation that they aim to account for, while those courses of investigation cannot be prescinded from them, that is, they would be unaccountable without these principles 33 .
Using a Kantian distinction to analyze Peirce's categories (firstness, secondness and thirdness), esthetic ideal and regulative hopes, we could say that the categories lie in the middle between constitutive and regulative principles. They can be considered to be constitutive in so far as they are present in every phenomenon; they can be considered to be regulative, in so far as they cannot teach anything determinate on experience before they gain a particular a posteriori determination. As a priori categories, they just offer a vague picture of what experience is like, but it is only particular experience and particular sign processes that determine them. On the contrary, the esthetic ideal and the regulative hopes are surely regulative principles, in as much as they offer only a guide for the development of signs, without furnishing any guarantee that these principles will bring a fruitful result. Nonetheless, they are necessary principles in order to account for that process of development.
These then are the transcendental elements that we can obtain from our transcendental consideration of Peirce's philosophy. We saw that to consider those elements a priori we do not need totally to neglect experience and a posteriori knowledge providing a purely deductive and derivative argument. On the contrary, the total of human semiotic processes is the first object we need to account for, abstracting those elements these processes cannot prescind from. . In Peirce's system, the categories through which we must think our experience leave room for freedom even in our representation of nature. Accordingly, the picture of nature Peirce developed in his metaphysics is intended to show how chance variations, indeterminacy, and purposeful development are characters that are not only applicable to human behavior, but also to nature itself. Peirce's metaphysics tries to demonstrate that the categories which are necessary to account for our representation of objects are also categories of being -considered in the latter's independence of thought 42 . What is important here is that the picture of nature that the categories of thought require is a representation not restricted to deterministic laws. In this way, following Peirce's suggestion, human purposeful behavior is explicable by means of the same categories as nature is.
The insight that human beings and nature are thinkable along the same path opens up a completely fresh trajectory in Peirce's system. Metaphysics is intended to
show that nature, in its independency from thought, is also triadic and purposive. As far as human beings are part of that nature, they can be seen as determined by the laws and tendencies proper to it. Thus, two lines of dependency can be simultaneously thought within Peirce's system. The former is the dependency of our representation of nature on the categorical structure of our thinking; the latter is the dependence of human beings on the nature they are part of. Peirce's perspective is thus able to think nature and human beings as being in continuity. This is impossible to do along the lines of Kant's philosophy. The rules that govern human practical behavior are totally different form the rules of nature. In this respect, Peirce is totally beyond Kant's standpoint and nobody would dispute that.
However, what needs to be emphasized is that when Peirce is concerned with the dependency of our representation of nature on the categorical structure of our thinking he can still be considered as proposing a kind of transcendental inquiry, in so far as it attempts to isolate those elements that are necessary for our representation of objects.
On the contrary, the dependency of human beings, and of their ways of thinking, on the nature they are part of clearly surpasses the limits of this transcendental speculation, trying to go beyond our representative thinking 43 . The picture of human beings and nature that we obtain following this illustration has numerous advantages. We can coherently think of a reciprocal determination between human subjects and nature, in 
Conclusion
In this paper I have described two different ways of interpreting Kant and, accordingly, two On the contrary, a transcendental inquiry in the alternative sense here presented needs only to consider experience and knowledge as they are normally determined in our ordinary and scientific practices. This 'datum' needs not to be vindicated or founded, but is the departing point from which a transcendental inquiry has to abstract those elements without which such experience and knowledge would not be Peirce's categories allow the concept of freedom to be given room in our conception of nature, and thus, also, allow us to think of nature and the self as being in continuity.
as a whole, the categories and the a priori forms of intuitions are not prescindable with respect to experience in general. Thus, if the purpose is that of accounting for the whole of experience, the cognitive structure provided by the categories and the form of intuitions is entirely needed, even if some particular experience can be thought of without the use of some of the elements under consideration. In Peirce, this problem does not arise, since the categories are present in any one of our experiences and thoughts.
17 'The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object but rather something under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me, since in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness' (KrV, B 138).
position by declaring that all relations are illusive appearances, since it is not merely true knowledge of them that he has cut off but every mode of cognitive representation of them' (EP 2:155). 22 In accordance with this idea, Peirce attacked Descartes for his attempt to set a universal doubt on human knowledge as a departing point in his philosophy (W 2:212). For Peirce, that doubt was a 'paper doubt', since it could not be a real doubt. This is a consequence of the immediate objective validity of our perception and knowledge. It is just experience that could generate a genuine doubt on such perception and knowledge; surely, it cannot be Descartes' purely speculative doubt.
23 Thomas Short advances this reading. He stresses that Peirce abandoned the deductive strategy of the new list for the inductive investigation of his phenomenology (Short, 2007: p. 31 ).
24 MS refers to Peirce's manuscripts. I indicate manuscript number (according to : Robin, 1967 ) and page number (I follow, when possible, Peirce's own paging).
25 William Rosensohn stresses that Peirce's phenomenology does not provide this priority to form (Rosensohn, 1974: pp. 24-5) . 26 In MS 908 Peirce attempts an a priori derivation of the categories. However, he stresses that this derivation cannot be considered transcendental, because we cannot directly derive truths about objects from mathematical a priori reasoning based on a self-sustaining proposition. See: (EP 2:363-6). This idea of a transcendental deduction is very close to the one we have attributed to justificatory accounts of Kant. 27 In this picture, metaphysics, the third department of Peirce's philosophy has to come later, trying to demonstrate that the semiotic structure of thought is doubled in reality, this latter considered in its independency from thought. This account of metaphysics could recall a typical philosophical problem of idealistic positions which characterizes even the justificatory account of the transcendental method, that is the problem of proving that our inner ideas really match reality. However, this is not Peirce's problem. He did not need to guarantee that our representations correspond to reality. As we saw, according to the doctrine of immediate perception, for Peirce representations have a direct objective validity, their representational character notwithstanding.
how his categories could have objective validity.
30 Vincent Colapietro notes how the phenomenological categories cannot but be derived from our semiotic practices (Colapietro, 2001) . 31 In metaphysics we need to go beyond signs and representations. However, the categorical structure discovered in the study of representational thinking is the basis even for Peirce's metaphysical hypothesis. 32 It is important to bear in mind that methodeutic is not only an explanation of the principles working in our inquiries, but also a science that want to enhance our inferential capacities. However, this does not contrast with what I am stressing here, since methodeutic is able to help the advancement of our inquiries by clarifying principles already at work in our unreflected methods of thinking. 33 See (Gava, 2008) for a transcendental reading of Peirce's esthetic ideal and regulative hopes. 34 Even if Kant did provide important reflections on methodological principles, especially in the last part of the first Critique and in the third Critique, he never considered as a task of philosophy that of offering elements to actually carry on inquiry.
35 It could be stressed that Kant's categories are also indeterminate and vague before their schematization.
However, they can be schematized a priori and thus gain determination.
36 (Short, 2007: pp.31-2, 64-6) .
37 (Midtgarden, 2007) . 38 The fact that no determinate connotation of the categories is required by Peirce is intimately connected to the fact that Peirce does not provide a transcendental deduction. 39 See, for example: (Colapietro, 2006) . 41 'Each habit of an individual is a law; but these laws are modified so easily by the operation of selfcontrol, that it is one of the most patent of facts that ideals and thought generally have a very great influence on human conduct' (CP 1.348). On Peirce's opposition to Kant with respect to the practical self see: (Colapietro, 2006 43 Two points have to be noted here. First: Peirce did not need this step toward an explanation of nature in its independency for guaranteeing the objectivity of our representation. As we saw, Peirce did not doubt this objectivity and considered our perception directly valid. Our knowledge cannot but be in signs and it is in this framework that we have to stress objectivity. He needed this metaphysical step just to explain how our thought is pragmatically valid to account for nature. Second: he was aware of the fact that every hypothesis on nature in its independency could not but be developed within our semiotic framework.
However, the particular way in which natural phenomena are arranged in our knowledge can allow a hypothesis, just a hypothesis, on what they need to have in common with our representative practices. 44 Karl Otto Apel also addresses this continuity between mind and nature (Apel, 1995) . However, he does not recognize that it is just because Peirce's categories allow room for freedom that this continuity is possible. 45 Peirce's viewpoint is able to accomplish what John McDowell asks for when he states: 'If we can rethink our conception of nature so as to make room for spontaneity, even though we deny that spontaneity is capturable by the resources of bald naturalism, we shall by the same token be rethinking
our conception of what it takes for a position to deserve to be called 'naturalism' ' (McDowell, 1996: p. 77 ). 46 In this sense Peirce's position can also be considered a naturalistic project. An attempt to develop a naturalistic version of transcendental philosophy along the lines of pragmatism is provided by Sami Pihlström (2003) .
